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ALTERNATIVES TO SENIORITY-
BASED LAYOFFS: RECONCILING 
TEAMSTER~ WEBER,ANDTHE 
GOAL OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT· 
OPPORTUNITY 
Minorities and women entered the workforce in increasing 
numbers during the 1970's.1 These employees, though, are typi-
· cally the first to lose work during economic downturns, and com-
pared with other groups of employees, they lose jobs in dispro-
portionate numbers. 2 The major obstacle to job security for 
minority and female employees has been the common practice of 
seniority-based layoffs, where the last hired are the first fired.8 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII")• forbids 
neutral employment practices having an adverse impact on mi-
norities and women; this prohibition, however, does not extend 
to bona fide seniority systems.11 Employers are thus not obliged 
to modify seniority-based layoff policies. 
Disproportionate minority and female unemployment could be 
alleviated if employers and unions were voluntarily to develop 
alternatives to seniority-based layoffs. Although the Supreme 
1. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, minority and female representation in 
the labor force increased from 1970 to 1979 as follows: 
1970 (in thousands) 1979 (in thousands) % increase 
White Males 46,013 53,074 15% 
Total Minority 9,197 12,306 34 
Minority Male 5,182 6,433 24 
Minority Female 4,015 5,863 46 
Total Female 31,520 43,391 38 
White Female 27,505 37,528 36 
Black Female 4,015 5,863 46 
See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STA-
TISTICS 10-12 (1980). 
2. See Edwards, Affirmative Action or Reverse Discrimination: The Head and Tail 
of Weber, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 713, 722-32 (1980). 
3. See Burke and Chase, Resolving the Seniority/Minority Layoffs Conflict: An Em-
ployer Targeted Approach, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 81, 82 (1978) (white males are 
able to maintain seniority over females and minorities through recurring slumps). 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
5. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
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Court has not outlawed voluntary modifications,6 two key prob-
lems arise with such efforts. Employers and unions may perceive 
no compelling reasons to modify a protected seniority system 
voluntarily, and not all alternatives to seniority-based layoffs are 
permissible. 
This Note advocates the use of legal incentives for adopting 
nonpreferential alternatives to seniority-based layoffs. Part I 
analyzes the impact of bona fide seniority systems on recently 
hired minorities and women. Part II discusses existing legal in-
centives for unions and employers to seek alternatives to strict 
seniority layoffs and for courts to enjoin such layoffs, thereby 
forcing the parties to negotiate over alternatives. Finally, part 
III examines two kinds of potential alternatives: racially prefer-
ential alternatives, which are prohibited under Title VII, and 
nonpreferential pptions, which are permissible and should be 
used increasingly. 
I. THE BURDEN OF SENIORITY-BASED LAYOFFS UPON MINORITY 
AND FEMALE WORKERS 
Employers have traditionally responded to economic down-
turns by laying off workers on the basis of strict seniority.7 Se-
niority-based layoffs often disadvantage minorities and women 
even if a facially nondiscriminatory seniority system is in effect;8 
an employer who only recently abandoned discriminatory prac-
tices or initiated an affirmative action hiring program, will lay 
off proportionately more minorities and women than white male 
6. See infra notes 18-26 and accompanying text. 
7. According to a recent Bureau of National Affairs survey of 400 major collective 
bargaining agreements, seniority is the sole or determining factor for layoffs in two-
thirds of the agreements. See 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 
(BNA) 60:1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BNA SURVEY]; see also Zimmer, Title VII: 
Treatment of Seniority Systems, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 80 (1980) (discussing benefits for 
employers, unions, and employees when seniority is used). 
Seniority used to calculate eligibility for benefits, such as vacation and pension bene-
fits, is termed benefit seniority. Competitive seniority, in contrast, determines the priori-
ties among employees for layoffs, promotions, transfers, and the like. See International 
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 343-44 (1977). For a general discussion 
of seniority's importance, see Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability 
of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1534-42 (1962); Cooper and Sobol, Seniority 
and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria 
of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1601 n.1 (1969); Marinelli, Seniority 
Systems and Title VII, 14 AKRON L. REV. 253, 253-55 (1980). For examples of contract 
provisions with varying uses of seniority in layoffs, see BNA SuRVEY, supra at 60:61-67. 
8. For a discussion of bona fide seniority systems, see infra notes 15-17 and accompa-
nying text. 
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workers when laying off according to seniority.9 A volatile econ-
omy exacerbates the problem, especially for workers in indus-
tries with cyclical demand. Recurring slumps prevent many mi-
norities and women, typically junior employees, from acquiring 
sufficient seniority for job security.10 
Employment practices that perpetuate the effects of past dis-
crimination ordinarily violate Title VII. 11 Section 703(h) of Title 
VII, however, exempts all "bona fide" seniority systems from Ti-
tle VII's prohibitions. In International Brotherhood of Team-
sters v. United States, u the Supreme Court held that even 
though a seniority system may perpetuate the effects of past dis-
criminaton, it can be "bona fide" within the meaning of section 
703(h).13 Adverse impact alone is insufficient to "outlaw the use 
of existing seniority lists. " 14 
According to Teamsters, a seniority system is bona fide if: (1) 
it applies equally to all groups; (2) it is rational and in accor-
dance with industry practice; (3) it did not have its genesis in 
racial discrimination; and (4) it has been neither negotiated nor 
maintained for an illegal discriminatory purpose. 111 The common 
9. Suppose, for example, that an employer has a work force of 1,000, 2% of which is 
black, in a labor market which is 20% black. After altering its discriminatory hiring 
practices, the employer may hire 25 more whites and 20 more blacks during a two year 
period, thereby increasing minority representation to 4%. If that employer were to lay 
off' workers with two years or less seniority, 80% of those affected would be minorities, 
and the minority representation would decrease from 4% to 2%. 
10. It has been suggested that "loss of employment, rather than inability to obtain 
employment, may be the most significant cause of black joblessness." Burke and Chase, 
supra note 3, at 82. 
11. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). To understand how past dis-
crimination is perpetuated, suppose that an employer refused to hire blacks in 1961 for 
discriminatory reasons. A black hired in 1965, after passage of Title VII, will be forever 
junior to whites hired between 1961 and 1965. Although the discrimination predated Ti-
tle VII, the seniority system operates to carry the effects of that discrimination into the 
future. Perpetuation of past discrimination is usually a violation of Title Vil under 
Griggs's disparate impact theory of discrimination. 
12. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
13. Section 703(h) reads in pertinent part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title . . . it shall not be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer to apply . . . different terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system 
... provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discrimi-
nate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). 
14. 431 U.S. at 353. 
15. Id. at 355-56; accord James v. Stockham Valves & Fitting Co., 559 F.2d 310, 352 
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978). These factors, though, are not meant 
to be an exhaustive list of considerations in determining bona tides. See Pullman-Stan-
dard v. Swint, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1785 n.8 (1982). Whether a seniority system has been 
negotiated or maintained for an illegal purpose is a question of fact to be resolved by the 
trial court, not a question of law or a mixed question of fact and law. Id. at '.'429. 
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"last-hired, first-fired" system exemplifies a seniority structure 
satisfying Teamsters's criteria;18 Title VII thus does not require 
abrogation of such systems notwithstanding their disproportion-
ate impact on minorities and women.17 
Employers and unions may, however, agree voluntarily to 
modify or abandon a bona fide system. Although Teamsters re-
ferred to seniority rights as "vested,"18 a close examination of 
that opinion and others indicates that such rights, where they 
exist, are not indefeasibly vested.19 Seniority rights are contrac-
tual only, and may be altered or eliminated through the collec-
tive bargaining process.10 
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 11 for example, the 
Supreme Court sanctioned awards of constructive seniority to 
individual victims of discrimination. 11 Providing constructive se-
16. It was apparently this very structure that Congress contemplated when it pro-
vided § 703(h) protection. See, e.g., 110 CONG. RBc. 7217 (1964) (remarks of Senator 
Clark)· ("ff under a 'last-hired, first-fired' agreement a Negro happens to be the 'last 
hired,' he can still be 'first fired' as long as it is done because of his status as 'last hired' 
and not because of his race."). 
17. This principle is now accepted outright under Title VII in a majority of the cir-
cuits. See, e.g., Hameed v. International Aas'n of Bridge Workers, Local No. 396, 637 
F.2d 506, 516 n.11 (8th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 575 F.2d 471 (4th 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 979 (1979); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 
576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); Alexander v. Aero 
Lodge No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978); Chance 
v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977); 
Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. IBEW Local Unions, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), 
vacated and remanded sub. nom EEOC v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 425 U.S. · 
987 (1976), on remand, 542 F.2d 8 (3d Cir. 1976); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 
F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976). 
The rule has been extended to protect systems from attack under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
(1976), see, e.g., Pettway, 576 F.2d at 1191 n.37; Johnson, 575 F.2d at 474, and Executive 
Order 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965), see, e.g., United States v. Trucking Management, Inc., 
662 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. East Texas Motor Freight Systems, Inc., 
564 F.2d 179 (~th Cir. 1977). 
Teamsters was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 83 
(1977), and § 703(h) protection was extended to non-length-of-service elements of senior-
ity systems in California Brewers Aas'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598 (1980) (plurality opin-
ion). Most recently, the Supreme Court held that§ 703(h) applies to bona fide seniority 
systems adopted after the effective date of Title VII. Thus, plaintiffs attacking any bona 
fide seniority system, under § 703(h), must prove intent to discriminate. See American 
Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 102 S.Ct. 1534 (1982). 
18. 431 U.S. at 353. 
19. See, e.g., id. at 347-48; Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) (em-
ployer permitted to give seniority credits to veterans); see also Aaron, supra note 7, at 
1541 ("seniority rights, unless protected by statute, are always subject to the union's 
power to change them" and are not truly vested). 
20. See Aaron, supra note 7, at 1536, 1540-41. An employer need not even include 
seniority at all. See supra note 7. 
21. 424 U.S. 747 (1976). 
22. Id. at 774, 778. 
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niority entails modifying existing seniority lists: discriminatees 
are placed ahead of other employees who have worked longer.23 
Such relief is nevertheless justified because it furthers the "cen-
tral 'make-whole' objective" of Title VII. 24 Similar objectives 
permit employers and unions to modify "last-hired, first-fired" 
seniority systems even if these modifications affect the expecta-
tions of nonminority workers. 211 
Because employers and unions are not obliged by Title VII to 
modify seniority systems, they may perceive no incentives to ab-
rogate layoff policies having a disproportionately adverse impact 
on minorities and women. Unless an employer closes its busi-
ness, most workers - usually white males - have little reason 
to encourage layoff alternatives. On the contrary, these employ-
23. Id. at 774. 
24. Id. at 778-79; cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) (seniority cred-
its given to army veterans). 
25. Such modifications are also supported by the public policy behind labor-manage-
ment relations. The longstanding policy of collective bargaining is particularly well-
suited to voluntary solutions of problems which either antedate Title VII or are not cov-
ered by its reach. See Moskowitz, New Opportunities for Unions to Foster Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity, 15 VAL. U.L. R.Ev. 1, 5 (1980). 
In developing modifications, the parties must balance the group interest in a layoff 
alternative with the interest of individual employees to be free from discrimination. Title 
VII strictures present an absolute "congressional command that each employee be free 
from discriminatory practices." Alexander~- Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974). 
Title VII proscribes employment discrimination against individual members of protected 
classes. See Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978) 
(involving sex discrimination); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(a)(l) (1976) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) 
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin .... "). Moreover, Title VII protects white employees as well as nonwhites. 
See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
There are, however, two general exceptions to Title VII's proscriptions. First, an em-
ployer may provide constructive seniority to individual victims of employment discrimi-
nation entitled to make-whole relief, thereby discriminating against nonvictims. See 
supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. Second, discrimination against individuals 
may be permitted under an affirmative action program implemented, inter alia, after a 
finding of discrimination, in compliance with federal regulations, or as a voluntary pro-
gram covering a traditionally segregated job category. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (voluntary program); Hunter v. St. Louis-San 
Francisco Ry., 639 F.2d 424, 426 (8th Cir. 1981) (employer allowed to discriminate 
against individual woman in compliance with Executive Order 11,246; "race is a legiti-
mate non-discriminatory reason in a gender suit"); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridge-
port Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975) 
(court ordered affirmative action). This second exception is narrowly circumscribed, es-
pecially when it involves voluntary plans. Its applicability will turn upon the degree to 
which group preferences interfere with the rights of individual non-group members. See 
infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text. For an analysis of group rights as they conflict 
with individual rights, see A. GOLDMAN, JUSTICE AND REVERSE D1SCRIMINATION 76-120 
(1979). 
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ees, protected by seniority and interested solely in their own job 
security, will pressure union leaders and employers to preserve 
the status quo. American labor has long favored the use of strict 
seniority systems because of the job security they foster/ ... 
Length of service provides a uniform objective standard by 
which an employer may measure benefits such as pension rights, 
promotions, transfers, and job protection. 2 7 Seniority thus elimi-
nates subjective or arbitrary treatment of employees in such 
matters.28 
Economic considerations can sometimes require employers 
and unions to examine layoff alternatives. The immediate and 
long run costs associated with layoffs - turnover costs, sever-
ance payments, and increased contributions to state unemploy-
ment insurance funds - can be extremely burdensome to em-
ployers.19 Recurring layoff patterns can imperil a union's status 
by disillusioning workers with union leaders who fail to provide 
job security. The current recession vividly demonstrates this 
phenomenon in both the public and private sectors of the 
economy.8° For example, the decline in automobile sales has 
threatened thousands of workers in auto-related industries with 
indefinite layoffs. 81 As a result, many workers, including the 
most senior, have successfully sought job security through vari-
26. See, e.g., Blumrosen and Blumrosen, The Duty to Plan for Fair Employment 
Revisited: Work Sharing in Hard Times, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 1082, 1085 (1975); Burke 
and Chase, supra note 3, at 93-94. The results of the 1982 negotiations between the 
United Automobile Workers and the automobile manufacturers reflect the importance of 
job security. See, e.g., Nehman, The Reasons for Historic Opening of Auto Contracts, 
Detroit News, Jan. 17, 1982, at El, col. 1. 
27. See supra note 7. 
28. See, e.g., Marinelli, supra note 7, at 253; Zimmer, supra note 7, at 80. Indeed, one 
article describes seniority as the most valuable "capital asset" an employee can accumu-
late during long service. Summers and Love, Work Sharing as an Alternative to Layoffs 
by Seniority: Title VII Remedies in Recession, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 902 (1976). 
29. See Rones, Response to Recession: Reduce Hours or Jobs?, 104 MONTHLY LAB. 
REv. 3 (Oct. 1981). In addition, if laid-off workers find jobs elsewhere, an employer may 
face high training costs for newly-hired employees during economic recovery. Id. at 5-6. 
The number of articles on work sharing which developed out of the economic slump of 
the mid-1970's indicates the interest in layoff alternatives during bad economic times. 
See, e.g., Blumrosen and Blumrosen, supra note 27; Levitan and Belous, Work Sharing 
Initiatives at Home and Abroad, 100 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 16 (Sept. 1977); Summers and 
Love, supra note 28. 
30. See, e.g., Ruben, Organized Labor in 1981: A Shifting of Priorities, 105 MONTHLY 
LAB. REv. 21, 25-26 (Jan. 1982); Serrin, Does Labor Face a Year of Cutbacks?, N. Y. 
Times, Jan. 10, 1982, National Economic Survey, at 16. 
31. See, e.g., Holusha, Leaders of Locals Endorse Ford Pact, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 
1982, at 10, col. 1 (reporting 140,000 workers on indefinite layoff at General Motors Cor-
poration); Ford and the UAW: A Historic Deal, Newsweek, Feb. 22, 1982, at 61 (report-
ing 54,830 workers at Ford Motor Company on indefinite layoff). 
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ous cost-saving alternatives. 82 
II. LEGAL IMPETUS FOR ADOPTING ALTERNATIVES TO SENIORITY-
BASED LAYOFFS 
Economic pressures alone, however, are insufficient to en-
courage some employers and unions to pursue alternatives to se-
niority-based layoff policies protected by International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. United States88 and its progeny. In such 
cases, minorities and women may invoke other statutory rights 
as an impetus to modify bona fide seniority systems. Unions and 
employers would seek possible layoff alternatives if they recog-
nized that not doing so could result in legal liability to minori-
ties and women. They would then discuss alternatives with the 
twin goals of saving money and eliminating the disparate impact 
of seniority-based layoffs." 
A. The Union's Duty of Fair Representation 
A union may be compelled to seek layoff alternatives to satisfy 
its duty of fair representation. 811 This duty would be breached if, 
for example, a union received a grievance concerning a seniority-
based layoff system's disparate impact and refused to seek layoff 
alternatives.88 In Teamsters the Court absolved the union from 
32. See, e.g., Ruben, supra note 30, at 25-26 (citing pay and benefit concessions in' 
airline, trucking, rubber, and meatpacking industries); Willing, Nehman, and Robinson, 
Union Wins Security, Company Trims Costs, Detroit News, Feb. 14, 1982, at Al, col. 5 
(analyzing Ford-UAW contract). 
33. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
34. The obligation here would not be to adopt alternatives, but to discuss them. Em-
ployers and unions are likely to find alternatives through discussion. Cf. First Nat'l 
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681 (1981) (recognizing possibility of plant 
closing alternatives developing out of negotiations). Certain conditions may, of course, 
require layoffs, e.g., an unexpected sharp drop in demand, and in such circumstances 
layoffs pursuant to bona fide seniority systems are permissible. Absent such exigent cir-
cumstances, though, legal incentives can be used to compel the parties to discuss 
alternatives. 
35. See generally Blumrosen, The Race to the Bargaining Table and/or the Court 
House, (1978) 1 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) 16:981. 
36. The extent to which a union has an affirmative obligation to protect its members 
from discriminatory employer conduct is not settled. Compare Macklin v. Spector 
Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (union held to have affirmative 
obligation to avoid discrimination), and Note, Seniority Systems and the Duty of Fair 
Representation: Union Liability in the Teamsters Context, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
711, 748 (1979) (union has affirmative duty to represent members) [hereinafter cited as 
Duty of Fair Representation in the Teamsters Context], with Thornton v. East Texas 
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Title VII liability and did not raise this issue.37 Potential liabil-
ity under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")88 can, 
however, supplement Title VII's coverage in the layoff context.•• 
The Supreme Court first identified a duty of fair representa-
tion in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.'0 In Steele, the 
Court held that a collective bargaining representative has a duty 
under the Railway Labor Act•1 to exercise its powers on behalf 
of all its members, including racial minorities without discrimi-
nation. •ll Representatives certified under the NLRA have a simi-
lar obligation of nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory conduct;" this 
obligation extends to negotiation, enforcement, and administra-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement." The duty of fair 
representation encompasses both adequate representation of and 
protection for minority and female employees' interests."& 
Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416, 424-26 (6th Cir. 1974) (union held not to have breached its 
duty in the absence of a filed grievance), and Note, Union Liability for Employer Dis-
crimination, 93 HARV. L. REv. 702, 722-23 (1980) (criticizing Macklin v. Spector Freight 
Systems) [hereinafter cited as Union Liability]. 
A related and equally unsettled issue is the standard by which union conduct is mea-
sured for a breach of its duty of fair representation. See Note, Can Negligent Represen-
tation Be Fair Representation? An Alternative Approach to Gross Negligence Analysis, 
30 CASE W. REa. L. REv. 537 (1980) (analyzing the varying standards and concluding 
that courts should apply a negligence standard for procedural matters and a stronger due 
care standard for discretionary substantive matters). This Note advocates a negligence 
standard to prove a prima facie case against a union that has failed to seek alternatives 
to seniority-based layoffs. See infra text accompanying note 50. 
37. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 356. 
38. 29 u.s.c. § 151 (1976). 
39. Title VII was designed to supplement existing labor laws, not supplant them. Al-
exander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974). One commentator has interpreted 
the duty of fair representation quite broadly to impose an affirmative obligation on un-
ions to dismantle seniority systems permitted under Title VII. See Duty of Fair Repre-
sentation in the Teamsters Context, supra note 36, at 763, 768-70. This interpretation 
seems unreasonable in light of the broad reading given Teamsters in the courts, and its 
extension to other statutes. See cases cited supra notes 16-17. The duty of fair represen-
tation need not be used to emasculate Teamsters. The analysis below advocates using 
NLRA rights as a means of encouraging parties to discuss modifications, not to affirma-
tively require results. Compare infra notes 35-58 and accompanying text (possible union 
liability for failure to advocate minority interests) and infra notes 59-70 and accompany-
ing text (possible employer liability for refusal to discuss the effects of layoff decisions) 
with Duty of Fair Representation in the Teamsters Context, supra note 36, at 768-70 
(union liability even if employer's intransigence prevented modification). 
40. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
41. 45 u.s.c. § 151 (1976). 
42. 323 U.S. at 204. 
43. See Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); see also Vaca v. Sipes, 
386 U.S. 171 (1967); Local Union No. 12, United Rubber Workers of America v. NLRB, 
368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966). 
44. See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Ivey v. Western Electric Co., 16 
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ,r 8297 (N.D. Ga. 1977). 
45. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 
SPRING 1982] Alternatives to Layoffs 531 
A union's simple acquiescence to bona fide strict seniority lay-
offs does not imply inadequate protection from discrimination.48 
The disproportionate effect of such layoffs is not discriminatory 
under Teamsters,•1 and a union does not subjec_t any of its mem-
bers to discriminatory treatment solely by permitting the bona 
fide system. 
A passive union, however, fails to represent adequately the in-
terests of minorities and women facing disproportionate layoffs. 
Unions often represent conflicting groups, some of which may be 
affected adversely by particular collectively bargained deci-
sions.48 The duty of fair representation is the quid pro quo for 
minorities and women bound by those decisions:49 it assures that 
affected workers, "stripped of traditional forms of redress," can 
pursue their interests:10 The duty of fair representation suggests 
unions should seek to eliminate the adverse impact on minori-
ties and women by pursuing alternatives to seniority-based lay-
offs. A union which negligently abides by majority will and fails 
to pursue the interests of minority and female members has 
breached its duty of fair representation.111 
In NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Association,112 union 
members raised a similar claim of inadequate representation. 
The plaintiffs, black De_troit police officers, suffered dispropor-
tionately from seniority-based layoffs. They claimed that the 
union's failure to negotiate for layoff alternatives violated its 
59, 64 (1975) (describing duty to represent minority interests and protect minorities from 
racial discrimination). 
46. If the system is not bona fide, then the union could be liable along with the em-
ployer under Teamsters. Cf. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 356 (implying that if system was not 
protected by § 703(h),. union's conduct in maintaining the system would have violated 
Title VII). 
47. The term "discrimination" is used here in the same sense that it is used in Title 
VII. 
48. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 421 U.S. 
59, 62 (1975); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1964); Johnson v. Airline Pilots 
of Northwest Airlines, 650 F.2d 133, 137 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 614 
(1982). 
49. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 429 U.S. 
59, 64 (1975); Duty of Fair Representation in the Teamsters Context, supra note 36, at 
765. 
50. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); accord Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 
Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 564 (1976). 
51. This point again raises the issue of group rights versus individual rights. See 
supra note 25. The duty of fair representation is better suited than Title VII to handle 
group grievances because unions, under the NLRA, are viewed as representatives of 
group interests as well as individual complaints, whereas Title VII's focus is on the 
individual. 
52. 525 F. Supp. 1215 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
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duty of fair representation.118 In support of this claim, the plain-
tiffs alleged that the union never intended to negotiate in good 
faith and that only when subsequent layoffs threatening nonmi-
nority officers became imminent did the union make concessions 
to avert layoffs. The district court denied the union's summary 
judgment motion, holding that the plaintiffs alleged sufficient 
factual issues to raise a question of fair representation." 
Minority and female union members would, then, state a 
prima facie claim of unfair representation if their union refused 
to seek and negotiate for permissible alternatives to seniority-
based layoffs. 1111 A union can never force an employer to accept 
layoff alternatives. 116 Its failure to secure adoption of an alterna-
tive could be defended if the options were economically unfeasi-
ble or if the union legitimately sought alternatives but the em-
ployer rebuffed its efforts. Thus, the union's only escape from 
liability is to negotiate with the employer over alternatives. 117 
This incentive should encourage unions to pursue layoff alterna-
53. Id. at 1218-20. The plaintiffs alleged that "the [union] was motivated to accept 
the layoffs in order to reduce black voting strength within the union." Id. 
54. Id. at 1220-21. Presumably, at trial the union could establish a defense by demon-
strating that it sought alternatives but was rebuffed by the city-employer. See infra 
notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
The most obvious defense arises where an employer refuses categorically to discusa 
alternatives. An employer might, however, be more subtle in its refusal to bargain. Sup-
pose, for example, that an employer agreed to discuss alternatives on the condition that 
union members sacrificed pay. If the employer did not make a reciprocal commitment to 
save jobs, the union should not be penalized for rejecting the offer. The employer's pro-
posal may simply indicate a desire to get something from the union without having to 
give in return - hardly the give and take bargaining contemplated under the NLRA. Cf. 
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962) (employer's unilateral acts held to violate NLRA 
because they inhibited process of discussion and reflected "cast of mind against reaching 
agreement"); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956) (finding duty on 
employer to provide wage data in negotiations, and to ensure good faith bargaining and 
honest claims in give and take of bargaining). 
55. Cf. Terrell v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 26 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ,i 
31,856 (5th Cir. 1981) (union not liable under Title VII since it sought alternatives to a 
non-bona fide system even though the system was contined by the employer). Union 
liability in such a case would be more certain if the union refused or perfunctorily 
processed minority workers' grievances. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 
650, 652 (1965). 
56. See NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). Such an obligation would be incon-
sistent with Teamsters as well as the NLRA. Thus, it is unlikely that the duty of fair 
representation could be used to erode these principles. But see supra note 39. 
57. The employer's duty to bargain during the contract term would be subject to any 
waiver in the contract or any precontract discussions. See infra note 68 and accompany-
ing text. Such a waiver is unlikely to arise, though, since the union would have to waive 
its desire to discuss the disparate impact of any future layoffs. This action could easily 
be construed as an attempt by the union to avoid representing its minority and female 
members - a clear breach of its duty of fair representation. See Emporium Capwell Co. 
v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 59, 64 (1975). 
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tives, even when faced with opposition from senior white male 
workers. 
B. The Employer's Duty to Bargain 
Although employer obstinacy may exonerate a union which 
has unsuccessfully sought alternatives to strict seniority layoffs, 
minorities and women are not necessarily remediless. This obsti-
nacy could engender a claim against the stubborn employer. As 
with unions, the spectre of legal action should furnish the em-
ployer with adequate incentive to seek layoff alternatives. 
A cause of action would arise, for example, if an employer re-
fused to bargain with a union over the disparate impact of a 
layoff decision. An employer clearly has the ultimate prerogative 
to respect and follow an existing bona fide seniority provision in 
determining whom to lay off. as Yet it could be compelled to bar-
gain over the disparate effect of such a decision. 
The Supreme Court has never held the impact of seniority-
based layoffs to be a mandatory subject of bargaining,69 such 
that a refusal to bargain would violate the NLRA. 80 The limits 
of mandatory subjects of bargaining were, however, recently dis-
cussed by the Supreme Court in First National Maintenance 
Corp. v. NLRB. 81 
58. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 353, 354. 
59. A mandatory subject of bargaining is one that falls in the category of "wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" described in section 8(d) of the 
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). An employer's unilateral change of or refusal to bar-
gain over such a matter violates the statutory duty to bargain. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 
U.S. 736, 743 (1962). The parties must bargain over such matters and may insist on their 
inclusion in the contract to the point of impaeee. See NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 
U.S. 342, 349 (1958). On the other hand, matters that are not mandatory may be bar-
gained over, but the parties may not insist on the issue to impaeeee. Id.; see also 
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 209-11 (1964). 
60. A refusal to bargain over a mandatory subject violates sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of 
the NLRA. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA reads in pertinent part: 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to refuse to bargain 
collectively with the representatives of hie employees ... . 
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Section S(d) reads in pertinent part: 
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the 
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, 
and other terms and conditions of employment . . . . 
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). See cases cited supra note 59; First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. 
v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Allied Chem. & Alkalai Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh 
Plate Glaee Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971). 
61. 452 U.S. 666 (1981). Although First Nat'l Maintenance involved a plant closing 
in response to economic pressure, id. at 686, n.22, the Court's description of which man-
agement decisions are mandatory subjects of bargaining is equally appropriate in the 
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Justice Blackmun described three general categories of man-
agement decisions. The first category consists of decisions hav-
ing only an indirect, attenuated relationship to employment: 
those decisions regarding, e.g., advertising or product design.61 
Such decisions are solely within management's prerogative and, 
under the Supreme Court's analysis, are not mandatory subjects 
of bargaining. 83 Thus, a decision to produce one product rather 
than another could lead to layoffs disproportionately affecting 
minorities and women; yet, an employer could refuse to bargain 
over that decision notwithstanding its attenuated connection to 
disproportionate layoffs. 
At the other extreme, however, are decisions so inextricably 
tied to the labor-management relationship - such as whether or 
when seniority rights will vest - that employers and unions 
must bargain over them. 84 If a union sought to effect a change in 
the vesting of seniority that would mitigate the impact of layoffs 
on minorities and women, and the employer refused to negoti-
ate, the employer would be liable under sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) 
of the NLRA for refusal to bargain. 81 
Decisions falling in the third, intermediate category discussed 
layoff context. 
First National Maintenance Corp. provided cleaning services for its customers; the 
contract at issue was with a nursing home. After a dispute with the home over a manage• 
ment fee, First National decided to terminate the contract and discharge employees at 
that location. The Court's broad summary of the types of management decisions which 
are and are not mandatory is helpful. The Court emphasized the limits of its holding, 
however, by listing specific facts of the particular case, such as absence of desire to relo-
cate, absence of antiunion animus, and the union's arrival after First National's eco• 
nomic troubles had begun. See 452 U.S. at 687-88. The extent to which these limitations 
affect the Court's discussion of mandatory subjects of bargaining is not clear. 
62. Id. at 676-77; see also Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 
223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
63. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677; cf. Textile Workers Union v. Darling-
ton Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1965) (decision to close business is peculiarly matter 
of management prerogative and does not, alone, constitute violation of provision against 
interference, restraint, or coercion of employees). 
64. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677; ~f. Awrey Bakeries, Inc. v. NLRB, 548 
F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1976) (layoffs are mandatory subjects of bargaining). 
65. For example, an employer using departmental seniority lists and "last-hired first• 
fired" could be faced with a significant disparate impact if one department had discrimi-
nated in the past. A union could force an employer to bargain over a change in the 
vesting of seniority rights from departmental seniority to plantwide seniority, thereby 
eliminating that impact. See generally infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing modification of departmental seniority systems). This cause of action, however, 
will usually be limited to precontract discussions, since most contracts already establish 
an order for layoffs, thereby freeing the employer from an obligation to discuss 
mandatory subjects during the contract term. See Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 
1216-17 (1951). See generally Note, Mid-Term Modification of Terms and Conditions of 
Employment, 1972 DUKE L.J. 813 (1972). 
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in First National Maintenance also may create a duty to bar-
gain. An employer's decision may have a direct impact on the 
employment relationship, but if economically motivated, it is at 
the heart of management prerogative.66 First National Mainte-
nance described a plant closing decision in these terms, and 
stated that an employer must bargain over the effects of such a 
decision.67 An employer's decision to lay off workers for eco-
nomic reasons also falls into this category: it has a direct impact 
on the employment relationship, yet is an important manage-
ment prerogative. If a union requests bargaining over the effects 
of such a decision, the employer should similarly be required to 
bargain. This obligation would continue during the contract 
term unless the union has expressly waived this particular right 
in the contract. 66 
The duty to bargain over the effects of the layoff decision is 
especially compelling when layoffs will disproportionately affect 
minorities and women. Negotiations prompted by this duty are 
likely to achieve constructive results, though the employer is not 
obliged to agree to union proposals. 69 The collective bargaining 
process handles particularly well employment problems of this 
nature which are outside the procedural or substantive ambit of 
Title VII.7° 
C. Judicial Initiatives 
Where statutory duties provide inadequate incentive, courts 
themselves may have powerful means to encourage employers to 
modify seniority-based layoff policies. Suppose, for example, a 
court order governs a particular employer's hiring practices but 
is silent as to layoffs. 71 Depending on future circumstances, a 
court might have discretion to alter the terms of the prior order 
66. 452 U.S. at 677-79. 
67. Id. at 677, n.15 (dictum). 
68. See Note, supra note 65, at 818-22; see also supra note 57 (discussing likelihood 
of waiver). A cause of action would be still more certain if the contract provided for 
management-union consultation over proposed layoffs. For examples of such provisions, 
see BNA SURVEY, supra note 7, at 60:11. 
69. See First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 681. 
70. See Moskowitz, supra note 25, at 5. 
71. Such an order could follow a finding of discriminatory hiring practices. See, e.g., 
Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); NAACP v. 
Allen, 492 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974). Alternatively, the court could enter a consent decree 
altering hiring practices without admitting discrimination. See, e.g., Youngblood v. Dal-
zell, 568 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1978); EEOC v. AT&T, 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978). 
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and force the parties to consider layoff alternatives. 
A court can modify the terms of any decree due to changed 
circumstances. 72 If a court had previously entered a decree re-
quiring that certain hiring goals be achieved, or certain racial or 
sexual disparaties be eliminated, and layoffs threatened to· re-
duce the representation of blacks and women, the decree's goals 
might never be achieved, nor the disparaties eliminated. The 
layoff decision would, in effect, prevent the employer from meet-
ing the prior decree's terms. Absent some compelling justifica-
tion for the circumvention, then, a court could enforce its decree 
by enjoining seniority-based layoffs. 
Brown u. Neeb78 exemplifies an appropriate exercise of judicial 
discretion in this area. In Brown, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a 
lower court decision enjoining the City of Toledo from laying off 
its firefighters on the basis of seniority. Toledo had entered into 
a consent decree requiring the implementation of an affirmative 
action plan with a five-year timetable and percentage goals. De-
spite the plan, the city had made only marginal progress after 
seven years. Layoffs threatened further to retard that progress. 
To ease the problem, the district court enjoined the city from 
implementing a layoff plan that would have decreased minority 
representation.74 The court of appeals agreed, holding that al-
though the consent decree did not mention layoffs, the district 
court could proscribe layoffs by seniority.711 
The majority76 was concerned by the city's failure to achieve 
72. See, e.g., Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353 (1953); United States v. Swift & 
Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 634 F.2d 929, 932-33 (5th 
Cir. 1981). 
73. 644 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1981). 
74. Id. at 554-57. 
75. Id. at 563, 565 (Brown, J., concurring). 
76. The majority opinion in Brown is described misleadingly in West's Federal Re-
porter as a concurring opinion by Judge Brown. As indicated in the slip opinion, Judge 
Keith delivered the court's judgment and an opinion. Brown v. Neeb, Nos. 80-3468, 80-
3476, slip op. at 1 (6th Cir. Mar. 3, 1981). The judgment affirmed the district court's 
decision. Keith's opinion expressed his belief that the lower court's injunction compelled 
representational layoffs. 644 F.2d at 563-64. The slip opinion also noted that Judge 
Brown delivered a separate opinion in which Judge Wiseman, the third judge on the 
panel, joined. Slip op. at 1. Brown dissociated himself from Keith's views regarding rep-
resentational layoffs stating that such layoffs would violate the collective bargaining 
agreement and Ohio law. 644 F.2d at 565-66. Judges Brown and Wiseman, the majority, 
thus affirmed the lower court's injunction and forced the parties to consider layoff alter-
natives other than representational layoffs. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
While the slip opinion noted the relationship between the two opinions, West Publish-
ing Company deleted the explanation in the official reporter. Letter from S. Edward 
Wagner, Associate Editor of West Publishing Co. to author (April 16, 1982) (discussing 
omission of explanatory statement in published opinion) (on file with the Journal of Law 
Reform). This omission has led some courts and plaintiffs to the erroneous conclusion 
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the consent decree's goals. Its opinion reflects an implicit belief 
that economic conditions did not compel layoffs;77 the city had 
other options available and need not have pursued a layoff pol-
icy.7s The court in Brown constructively forced the parties tone-
gotiate over alternatives to a bona fide seniority system unless 
the city could demonstrate both the economic necessity. of the 
layoffs and its good faith effort to meet the consent decree's 
terms.79 
III. ALLOWABLE ALTERNATIVES - PREFERENTIAL OR 
- NONPREFERENTIAL? 
Economic incentives and a variety of legal incentives - the 
duty of fair representation, the duty to bargain collectively, and 
the courts' power to modify decrees - all encourage utilizing 
alternatives to seniority-based layoffs. Once employers and un-
ions admit their responsibility to seek such alternatives, they 
must develop them. Two types of alternatives exist: racially 
preferential layoffs,so which violate Title VII, and nonpreferen-
tial options,s1 which do not. If minorities and women use the 
devices available to them to promote nonpreferential alterna-
tives, the goal of equal employment opportunity will remain a 
realistic one regardless of economic fluctuations. 
that Judge Keith's views on representational layoff's are controlling. See, e.g., Boston 
Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965, 972, 978 (1st Cir. 1982), petition for cert. 
filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3140 (U.S. Aug. 9, 1982) (No. 82-259) (finding "considerable support" 
in Brown and erroneously citing Keith's opinion as controlling); Stotts v. Memphis Fire 
Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 566 (6th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3120 (U.S. 
Aug. 5, 1982) (No. 82-229) (Keith, J., erroneously citing his earlier Brown opinion as 
controlling); United States v. District of Columbia, 654 F.2d 802, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 637 (1981) (court erroneously citing Brown); NAACP v. Detroit 
Police Officers Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 1215, 1220 (E.D. Mich. 1981)(plaintiff's relying on 
Keith's opinion as controlling). To the extent that these cases rely on Judge Keith's 
opinion as controlling in Brown, they are mistaken. See Stotts, 679 F.2d at 568 (Martin, 
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (explaining that Keith's opinion is not control-
ling); Letter, supra. 
77. Brown, 644 F.2d at 565-66 (Brown, J., concurring). 
78. This is supported by the numerous references to possible alternatives (four such 
references in a two-page opinion). Id. at 564-66 (Brown, J., concurring). 
79. Cf. Youngblood v. Dalzell, 568 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (layoff's by 
seniority not enjoined where city made progress in meeting consent decree which was 
silent as to layoffs). 
80. See infra pt. III A. 
81. See infra pt. III B. 
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A. Preferential Alternatives to Seniority-Based Layoffs 
Under a preferential layoff system, an employer establishes 
separate seniority lists for, e.g., minorities and nonminorities,82 
and as layoffs become necessary, discharges enough workers 
from each list to maintain prelayoff minority representation. 
This option involves an overt preference because it ultimately 
accords the benefits of job security to low seniority workers by 
virtue of race or sex. Such a preferential system, though volun-
tary, is prohibited by Title VIl.88 
The only Supreme Court case focusing on voluntary pref er-
ences in the employment context is United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber,84 in which the Court permitted Kaiser Alumi-
num to adopt voluntarily a preferential training and promotion · 
program. The Court warned, however, that not every plan would 
be permissible under Title VIl.85 It upheld Kaiser's plan on the 
82. Female-male lists, or even three lists - minority, nonminority female, and 
nonminority male - are also possible. 
83. Several commentators, including the EEOC, have concluded that voluntary af-
firmative action or preferential treatment is permissible in the layoff context as an exten-
sion of United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). See, e.g., EEOC 
statement on Affirmative Action, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.3(c)(4) (1981); 1 A. LARSON, EMPLOY· 
MENT D1scRIMINATION § 26.21 (1981); Euuss, Modifying Seniority Systems Which Per-
petuate Past Discrimination, 31 LAB. L.J. 37, 44-45 (1980); Johnson, Voluntary Affirma· 
tiue Action in the Post-Weber Era: Issues and Answers, 32 LAB. L.J. 609, 614-16 (1981); 
Marinelli, supra note 7, at 259-66; Case Note, The Impact of United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber On Affirmative Action Planning, 7 OHIO NORTH. U.L. REv. 987, 996-97 
(1980); Case Note, Civil Rights - Employment Discrimination - Voluntary Affirma-
tive Action Allowed. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), 3 U. 
ARK. LITTLE RocK L.J. 481, 490, 491 n.57 (1980). These commentators, however, did not 
independently analyze the Weber test as it applied to layoffs, but simply presumed 
Weber allows layoff preferences. Another commentator reasons that since Weber actually 
involved seniority rights, employers and unions voluntarily may negotiate preferences 
into competitive seniority systems. Boyd, Affirmative Action in Employment - The 
Weber Decision, 66 lowA L. REV. 1, 38-40 (1980). Although Weber did involve seniority 
rights to the extent that they determined selection among Kaiser's employees for a new 
training program, 443 U.S. at 198-99, it did not raise the issue of abrogation of preexist-
ing seniority rights. 443 U.S. at 215 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Because Weber's under-
lying rationale is based on balancing affected employees' interests, the degree to which 
an employer interferes with existing expectations is quite important. See infra notes 88-
94 and accompanying text. But see Boyd, supra, 66 lowA L. REv. at 27 (suggesting differ-
ence in seniority expectations between Kaiser's new training program and other contexts 
is not important). 
84. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
85. Id. at 208; see also Parker v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) ("We do not believe that Weber supports the proposition that no purported affirm-
ative action plan is ever unlawful unless it requires discharge, permanently bars advance-
ment, or maintains racial balance .... "); Setser v. Novack Investment Co., 657 F.2d 
962, 968-69 (8th Cir. 1981) (discussing burden of proof where attacking a voluntary af. 
firmative action plan). 
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ground that Title VII permits some voluntary efforts designed to 
eliminate traditionally segregated jobs. 86 
Group remedial efforts appear to be incompatible with Title 
VII's focus on the individual. 87 The Court in Weber, though, felt 
that such efforts are permissible if they balance the group inter-
est in affirmative action against the individual nonminority ap-
plicant's (or worker's) expectations of nondiscriminatory86 treat-
ment.89 Any group remedial plan must attempt to accomodate 
both sets of goals to the greatest extent possible. Thus, in seek-
ing remedial responses to racial disparaties in their work forces, 
employers must adopt a balancing approach.90 
In pursuing this approach, the Weber Court noted five key el-
ements in Kaiser's program.91 Kaiser's plan was voluntary and 
had been collectively bargained. More significantly, the Court 
found that it did not unnecessarily trammel nonminority inter-
ests, bar advancement of nonminorities on account of race, re-
place nonminorities with minorities on account of race, or main-
tain percentages of representation. 91 Although Weber did not 
explicitly depict any of these factors as determinative of a plan's 
validity, the Court did find all of them to be present in sus-
taining Kaiser's plan. It seems likely that while the absence of 
any single factor is not necessarily fatal to a voluntary plan, the 
absence of several indicates an impermissible remedial program. 
Based on this reasoning, voluntary preferential layoff plans 
are impermissible; they fail to accomodate group and individual 
interests.98 Use of collective bargaining to develop preferential. 
86. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09. 
87. See supra note 25. 
88. In this context, "discriminatory" is used in the senae of an arbitrary distinction or 
classification as opposed to any definition implying legal consequences. Compare infra 
note 47 and accompanying text. 
89. Such a balancing approach is implicit in the Court's description of Kaiser's plan. 
443 U.S. at 207-09. 
90. In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), the 
Court described the judicial process of developing a reasonable remedy as a balancing 
approach. Id. at 375. Balancing should be required equally when the parties to a contract 
consider remedial devices. See Edwards, supra note 2, at 752-53 ("An employer's volun-
tary preference will stand or fall on its own strength as a remedy."). 
91. Other factors, such as duration, or the fact that the Weber plan gave white em-
ployees a training program they never had before, are important for distinguishing fu-
ture cases from Weber, but are essentially factual instances of the five inquiries set forth 
above. 
92. 443 U.S. at 208. 
93. Cf. Lehman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 651 F.2d 520-27 (7th Cir. 1981)(Weber 
attempts to balance societal interests in affirmative action with the individual's right to 
be free from discrimination); Setser v. Novack Investment Co., 657 F.2d 962, 968 (8th 
Cir. 1981) (plan must be reasonable in light of remedial purpose); Parker v. Baltimore & 
0. R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (must employ a delicate balancing of all 
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layoff plans does not make them permissible. Collective bargain-
ing is just one factor to consider in determining validity, and its 
presence is not alone determinative. An agreement to lay off em-
ployees of one race or sex would surely be prohibited even 
though it was a collectively bargained preference.114 A remedial 
program is permissible only if an analysis of the other Weber 
factors is also satisfactory. Preferential layoff plans cannot with-
stand such scrutiny. 
1. Nonminority workers' interests- Seniority rights are es-
sential in allocating job benefits and underscore the importance 
of the expectations workers have built during their length of ser-
vice. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently acknowledged the 
"overriding importance" of seniority interests.&& Emphasizing 
the strength of these expectations, the Second Circuit has re-
fused to extend quota relief to the layoff context:96 the effect on 
a small number of readily identifiable nonminority workers was 
too harsh to justify layoff protection based on race alone.97 Ex-
pectations are no less intense when a plan is imposed voluntarily 
interests involved); Rabin, Fair Representation Constraints in the Voluntary Elimina-
tion of Job Discrimination, 5 EMP. REL. L.J. 337, 338-39 (1979-80) (Weber implies that 
voluntary collectively bargained plans do not violate Title VII if they are within Weber's 
guidelines). 
Applying Weber to the layoff context is admittedly an extention of the opinion; how-
ever, this application should not be precluded. See Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs. Inc., 
480 F. Supp. 539, 548 (D. Nev. 1979)(applying Weber criteria to the layoff context), aff'd, 
658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981). Commentators have been willing to extend Weber to the 
layoff context, but have not fully analyzed its impact. See supra note 83. Furthermore, 
at least one court has engaged in a misguided attempt to apply Weber to layoffs. See 
infra note 108. 
94. Such an agreement clearly violates § 703(a), which reads: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(!) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in 
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). See also McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 
U.S. 273 (1976) (Title VII covers white employees as well as blacks). 
95. American Tobacco Company v. Patterson, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 1541 (1982) (citing 
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 346 (1964)). 
96. See Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993, 998-99 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977). 
97. Id. The court distinguished outright quota relief from constructive seniority, 
which also affects a small number of identifiable nonminorities. Constructive seniority 
does not dispense benefits on the basis of race alone. Rather, seniority credit is given to 
identifiable victims of discrimination because and to the extent that they have been dis-
criminated against. 534 F.2d at 999. 
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by a union and an employer; therefore, such plans unnecessarily 
trammel nonminority workers' interests.98 
2. Advancement of nonminority and male workers- An em-
ployer choosing to lay off a white employee with greater senior-
ity than a retained black employee erects both a direct and an 
indirect obstacle to the white employee's advancement. The di-
rect barrier is the absence of a job - promotion is impossible 
when the worker is out of work. Indirectly, the employee's ad-
vancement is affected because various benefits and recall rights 
are lost over time, setting back future advancement if the em-
ployer rehires that individual.99 The decision of whom to lay off, 
made solely on the basis of race, therefore unreasonably bars the 
advancement of the laid-off employee. 
This reasoning is consistent with Weber. A preferential hiring 
system bars a potential white employee's advancement by never 
hiring him. Also, in the hiring context, no assurance exists that 
all who apply will be hired. Weber's concern was the advance-
ment of persons already hired, not individuals who were never 
hired. 100 Preferential layoffs are thus an impermissible form of 
group relief even though preferential hiring systems may be 
legitimate. 
3. Replacing nonminorities with minorities- Preferential lay-
offs directly replace nonminority or male employees with minor-
ity or female workers of lower seniority status on the basis of 
race or sex. Ordinarily, an employer using a preferential layoff 
system follows normal seniority lists until the percentage of mi-
norities and women laid off will be too high. At that point, white 
or male workers with greater seniority lose their protection and 
a minority or female worker fills the position. 101 Overt displace-
ment of this nature contrasts sharply with the training program 
upheld in Weber where "no whites were fired, laid off or de-
moted to make room for black workers."102 Preferential layoffs 
98. Kaiser's program defeated the expectations of an identifiable group of employees 
consisting of all Kaiser nonminority employees, such as Brian Weber, who were denied a 
place in the training program although they had greater seniority than minority ac-
ceptees. 443 U.S. at 199. The plan, though, established a new training program and was 
not designed to defeat existing contract rights and expectations. A preferential layoff 
plan, in contrast, would-involve abrogating existing seniority rights and is distinguishable 
from the Weber plan. Id. at 215 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also supra note 83. 
99. For a discussion and analysis of various contract provisions regarding layoffs and 
their effect on seniority rights, see BNA SURVEY, supra note 7, at 75:1, 75:122-24. 
100. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. 
101. See, e.g., Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 539, 541 (D. Nev. 
1979). 
102. Edwards, supra note 2, at 758. While Professor, now Judge, Edwards is an advo-
cate of reasonable hiring preferences, he also recognizes that such preferences cannot 
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thereby violate Weber's nondisplacement command by unrea-
sonably replacing incumbent nonminority males with minorities 
or females. 103 
4. Maintaining percentages of minorities and women- Pref-
erential layoff policies aim to maintain percentages of women 
and minorities during the layoff period104 despite Weber's prohi-
bition of maintaining percentage representations of certain 
groups. Weber discussed Title VII's legislative history,. which 
suggests that all preferential treatment is forbidden, and con-
cluded that its prohibitions apply only to plans which maintain 
existing percentages. 101 Plans designed as temporary measures to 
attain goals, in contrast, are permissible.106 While this distinc-
tion can be criticized, 107 plans based on racial preferences 
designed to maintain percentages - such as preferential layoffs 
- clearly are impermissible under Weber. 
A court applying all of Weber's tests to preferential layoffs 
must necessarily conclude that they are illegal.108 Preferential 
extend to layoffs. 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. at 720-21 ("Teamsters clearly rejects remedies 
that result in direct displacement of incumbent nonminority employees ... and it im-
pliedly prohibits 'fictional seniority' for minorities as a way to offset the effects of last-
hired first-fired."). 
103. A rule of nondisplacement is referenced in the legislative history of Title VII. 
See Interpretive Memorandum of Floor Managers, Senators Clark and Case, 110 Cong. 
Rec. 7213 (1964)(An employer "would not be obligated - or indeed permitted - to fire 
whites in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vancancies, or, once Ne-
groes are hired, to give them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers 
hired earlier."). 
104. Alternatively, a plan could be designed to achieve racial percentages. For exam-
ple, an employer could decide to lay off as many white employees as necessary to achieve 
a percentage of black employee representation greater than that before the layoffs. This 
would be an even more unreasonable situation, however, because it clearly replaces white 
workers with blacks. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. 
105. Weber, 443 U.S. at 207 n.7 & 216 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
106. The plan would have to satisfy Weber's other criteria as well. See supra notes 
91-92 and accompanying text. 
107. For one such criticism, see Weber, 443 U.S. at 240 n.19 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
108. This conclusion was rejected in Tangren v. Wackenhut Serva., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 
539 (D. Nev. 1979). The court's analysis of Weber, however, was too superficial to justify 
its conclusion. 
For example, the court noted the maintain/achieve distinction of Weber, but failed 
correctly to apply the standard. The majority found that a seniority override provision, 
guaranteeing that percentages would be maintained during the layoffs, was intended to 
acheive certain goals and was therefore permissible. 480 F. Supp. at 541,547. This analy-
sis, though, effectively ignores the Weber Court's intention to disallow plans maintaining 
certain goals. 
Moreover, the court found that the seniority provision did not require the replacement 
of white workers with blacks. 480 F. Supp. at 549. This conclusion is contradicted by a 
later statement that the provision obliged white employees to "go before those minority 
employees" hired pursant to the employer's affirmative action plan. Id. In these two re-
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layoff systems fail four of the five key Weber factors: they un-
necessarily trammel nonminority and male expectations, bar ad-
vancement of nonminority males, replace nonminority males 
solely because of race or sex, and maintain percentages of minor-
ity and female workers.109 
B. Nonpreferential Alternatives to Seniority-Based Layoffs 
Alternatives to layoffs, such as work sharing110 and contract 
concessions, m benefit all workers equally and burden all work-
ers economically without regard to race or sex. Such plans do 
not violate Title Vl111ll and are compatible with the collective 
bargaining process under the NLRA. Because collective bargain-
ing necessarily involves substantial give-and-take113 a union se-
curing jobs for all its members, including minorities and women, 
can make concessions which affect all workers without breaching 
its duty of fair representation.114 So long as its decisions are not 
guided by discriminatory reasons and are not implemented uni-
laterally, m an employer can pursue a number of nonpreferential 
alternatives to seniority-based layoffs.118 
spects, the Tangren court misapplied the Weber test. 
109. The one Weber test preferential layoff systems may pass is that they are 
voluntary. 
110. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. 
111. See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text. 
112. This assumes that the alternative does not violate the disparate impact standard 
for discrimination set out in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs es-
tablished that facially neutral employment practices that have an adverse impact on pro-
tected groups and are not justified by business necessity violate Title VII. See generally 
Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co, and the Concept of Em-
ployment Discrimination, 71 M1cH. L. REv. 59 (1972). 
113. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964) 
(purpose of NLRA is to promote peaceful settlement of industrial disputes through 
negotiation). 
114. Such decisions are nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory decisions permitted under 
the duty of fair representation. See supra notes 40-~ and accompanying text. 
115. Unilateral changes by the employer may violate the contract and the NLRA. 
See, e.g., A. Hoen & Co., 64 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 197 (1975) (Feldesman, Arb.) (employer 
violated contract by unilaterally altering the work week to respond to economic hard-
ship). But see Ambridge Borough, 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 810 (1979) (Dean, Arb.) (absent 
clear contract provision to the contrary, employer may alter work week). 
116. Perhaps the best example of an employer which has given job security to its 
workers through layoff alternatives is the Pennsylvania Bell Telephone Company. While 
computerization and modernization led to massive job loss in the telephone industry, 
Pennsylvania Bell avoided layoffs by adopting various proposals suggested below. The 
company froze hiring, moved workers temporarily to departments where they were 
needed, offered retraining and income maintenance programs, eliminated the use of con-
tract labor, and instituted work sharing in protecting Bell workers. See Wallace, Indus-
trial Relations in a Job-Loss Environment, The Telephone Industry in Pennsylvania, 
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1. Work sharing options- Perhaps the most common alterna-
tive to layoffs is work sharing.117 Essentially, a work sharing plan 
allocates available work to ~all workers already employed. Sup-
pose, for example, that an employer has 160 employees working 
8-hour days, or 1280 worker hours of production per day. If the 
employer must reduce production by an equivalent of 160 hours 
per day, it could either lay off 20 workers or have the same 160 
workers share the work by working 7-hour days. Such a plan 
may be combined with incentives for early retirement, voluntary 
layoffs, and voluntary transfers to increase the availability of 
work for those retained.118 An employer might also agree to stop 
hiring temporary or new workers in other departments if its cur-
rent workers facing layoffs could fill those positions.119 
2. Wage and work rule concessions- Over the past few years, 
many unions made contract concessions in return for job secur-
ity. These concessions typically have been a response to poten-
tial job loss for all workers in a given bargaining unit, rather 
than to the disparate impact layoffs could have on some work-
ers.120 Nevertheless, contract concessions can prevent layoffs for 
31 LAB. L.J. 473 (1980). 
117. Sixteen percent of major contracts contain work sharing provisions. See BNA 
SURVEY, supra note 7, at 60:3; see also supra note 29. 
118. See, e.g., Summers and Love, supra note 28, at 924-25. Supplemental unemploy-
ment benefit plans can be used as incentives for voluntary layoffs. See Summers and 
Love, supra note 28, at 924 n.90. For a discussion of supplemental unemployment benefit 
plans in contractual settings, see BNA SURVEY, supra note 7, at 53:4-7, 53:601. Work 
sharing plans as alternatives to layoffs have been implemented with success on a wide 
scale in Western Europe and in limited instances in the United States. See Levitan and 
Belous, supra note 29, at 18. 
119. Other acceptable modifications of a work sharing plan might be rotational layoffs 
or periodic plant shutdowns, depending upon which was more adaptable to a specific 
industry. See Summers and Love, supra note 28, at 932-35. 
One drawback to work sharing is that employees lose take-home pay since they work 
fewer hours. But this loss of wages may be alleviated through a change in unemployment 
compensation laws or employer's supplemental unemployment benefit plans ("SUB's"). 
SUB's are additional payments to workers who lose jobs and collect state unemployment 
compensation. Collecting state benefits is often a prerequisite to collecting SUB pay-
ments. See generally BNA SURVEY, supra note 7, at 53:4-7, 53:601; Note, Supplemental 
Unemployment Benefits: Perquisite of Seniority or Deferred Compensation for Re-
turning Veterans?, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 494, 496-99 (1980). A bill is pending in 
Congress which, if passed, would provide strong encouragement for states to give partial 
unemployment benefits to "individuals whose workweek is reduced pursuant to an em-
ployer plan under which such reductions are made in lieu of total layoffs." H.R. 3005, 
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). California has adopted a statute which provides for unem-
ployment benefits for shortened work weeks. See Cal. Unem. Ins. Code § 1279.5 (West 
Supp. 1981), as amended, Act of Sept. 7, 1979, ch. 506, § 2. The EEOC has also advo-
cated these changes in a recent statement on layoff alternatives. 45 Fed. Reg. 60, 832 
(1980). 
120. See, e.g., Williams, Savings Jobs by Cutting Wages, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1981, 
at Al, col. 3; 104 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 267-68 (1980) (United Rubber Workers accepted 
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the present and allow newly hired minority and female workers 
to accumulate sufficient seniority to withstand future down-
turns. 
Concessions might be wage and benefit concessions121 or work 
rule concessions, e.g., agreements to cancel certain shifts or pro-
vide voluntary overtime rules. in Contract concessions might ap-
propriately be combined with the measures outlined in a work 
sharing program. 1118 In addition, if an employer is faced with an 
extraordinary economic burden, and must lay off workers, it 
could provide for retraining programs and seniority accumula-
tion during attendance in such programs. 1114 While this would 
not eliminate the disparate impact of the original layoff, it 
would provide the laid off workers, most of whom are minorities 
or women, with a foundation upon which to build job protection 
for the future. 
3. Other seniority system modifications- Quite apart from 
alternatives attempting to avoid layoffs altogether, certain modi-
fications of seniority systems themselves can eliminate the im-
pact of layoffs on minorities and women. For example, an em-
ployer and a union can agree to consolidate the seniority lists at 
two separate plants. 1211 Consolidation may lessen the impact of 
layoffs on minorities and women by spreading layoffs over a 
larger pool of employees. Because the goal of consolidation is to 
achieve equal opportunity in a nondiscriminatory fashion, and in 
compliance with Title VII, a union could pursue such a change 
without breaching its duty of fair representation.us 
Alternatively, a plant might convert from a departmental se-
niority systemu7 to a plantwide seniority system. An employer 
using a departmental seniority system may have discriminated 
12.9% cuts in wages to preserve jobs); Detroit's Largest Union Agrees to a Wage Freeze, 
N.Y. Times, July 2, 1981, at Al4, col. 6. · 
121. See supra note 120. 
122. See, e.g., Robinson, Workers Pass Concessions, Detroit News, Oct. 29, 1981, at 
Bl, col. 4. 
123. See, e.g., Sheeran, Title VII and Layoffs Under the "Last-Hired, First-Fired" 
Seniority Rule: The Preservation of Equal Employment, 26 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 409, 
460-64 (1976). 
124. See generally id.; 105 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (1980) (discussing "model" plant 
closing strategy covering, inter alia, retraining programs and seniority rights). 
125. See, e.g., Burchfield v. United Steelworkers of America, 577 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 
1978). 
126. See, e.g., id. at 1020. 
127. This system measures seniority by total length of service in a particular depart-
ment. See Cooper and Sobol, supra note 7, at 1602. Such a system can be bona fide. See 
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 356 n.41 (1977); see also 
Carroll v. United Steelworkers of America, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 238 (D. Md. 
1980) (departmental seniority system held bona fide). 
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in the past only in certain departments. When discrimination 
ceases, many minorities and women may transfer from their old 
departments to formerly "white-male" departments. When a 
layoff comes, these new transfers will be among the earliest laid 
off in the new department. Had a plantwide seniority system 
existed, which accounted for total length of service in all de-
partments, those workers might have been protected. Plant-
wide seniority has been suggested by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission as an alternative to reduce the impact 
of layoffs on minorities and women.128 Such a system was 
also adopted by a consent decree covering nine major steel 
companies.129 
CONCLUSION 
Job security concerns all workers, especially in troubled eco-
nomic times. The concern is felt most deeply by women and mi-
norities who are entering the work force in increasing numbers 
due to nondiscriminatory hiring policies and affirmative action 
plans. Unions and employers that rely on the well-established 
principles of "last-hired, first-fired" contribute to this insecurity, 
but face no Title VII liability despite the disparate impact of 
seniority-based layoffs. The statutory duty of fair representa-
tion, the duty to bargain, and the judicial power to modify and 
enforce decrees are all means to achieve the goals of Title VII. 
Use of these means will help bring about Title VIl's policy of 
equal employment opportunity in times of adversity as well as 
prosperity. 
-Paul M. Hamburger 
128. See, e.g., EEOC statement on alternatives to layoffs, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,832 (1980). 
129. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975) (up-
holding consent decree). The consent decree is reprinted in 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 
431:125-52 (seniority provision at 431:133). 
